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The Opacity of Fictional Minds:  
Transparency, Interpretive Cognition and the 
Exceptionality Thesis 
 
 
Marco Bernini 
 
 
 
The primacy of vision as a paradigm of knowledge is deeply rooted in Western cultures. As 
Hanna Arendt notes in The Life of Mind, ‘the predominance of sight is so deeply embedded in 
Greek speech, and therefore in our conceptual language, that we seldom find any 
consideration bestowed on it, as though it belonged among things too obvious to be noticed’.1 
Having resisted eminent attacks in the last century, a significant ocularcentrism is still 
detectable in many disciplines dealing with epistemological concerns. 2  Observations of 
processes, contemplations of truths, inspections of experiences, reflections on events are still 
largely considered (often metaphorically) foremost procedures for acquiring knowledge in 
many fields. Despite its limitations, which can develop nonetheless into theoretically fertile 
resistances, the ubiquity of visual models might have the benefit of fostering cross-
disciplinary debates and mutual enrichment on  common conceptual ground.  
That is the case, this essay will argue, with an optical metaphor that unites cognitive 
science and narrative theory in conceptualising the epistemic accessibility of the mind in 
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terms of its transparency. Optical metaphors proliferating in both areas  include the concept 
of ‘focalisation’ or ‘visual field’ in narratology and the concept of ‘introspection’ 
(etymologically a ‘looking within’) in cognitive psychology. 3 Among such metaphors, the 
‘transparency of the mind’ is in fact a shared optical image to describe the accessibility of 
cognitive processes and phenomenological experiences. This seeming terminological 
convergence, however, conceals important differences and potential confusion about what it 
is transparent to whom, or what higher or lower degrees of transparency imply in terms of 
accessibility.  
Since a number of distinct uses of the transparency metaphor can be discerned in 
cognitive science and narrative theory, I will therefore pluralise it by referring to different 
transparencies of the mind. Cognitive science speaks of a transparency of the mind in at least 
two kinds of cognitive scenarios.4 One is the so-called transparency of self-knowledge or 
self-transparency (T1). This is the cornerstone of the ‘Cartesian epistemology’, according to 
which we have direct, non-mediated access to our own mind and mental states (beliefs, 
desires, conscious thinking, sensations, emotions). 5  The mind is therefore said to be 
transparent to itself because (if and when) the contents and qualities of mental states are 
introspectively fully accessible to the experiencing subject. A second condition of 
transparency to which cognitive science has paid particular attention is in relation to outward 
perceptual experiences where, inversely, transparency indicates the introspective 
inaccessibility of phenomenal states or their ‘phenomenal transparency’ (T2).6 When looking 
at the colour blue, the classic example goes, we can just attend to the colour blue and not to 
the experience itself because we see through the process channelling that experience. Here 
the higher the transparency of the experience, the lower its accessibility.  
Both assumptions have been recently disputed or substantially revisited by new 
strands in cognitive science, which advocate that perception and self-knowledge are instead 
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inherently opaque. Within this alternative account of the mind, encompassing a range of 
perspectives that I will group and present in the next section as the ‘interpretive cognition’ 
framework, transparency is considered just an illusory feeling resulting from the positive 
outcome of successful interpretive mechanisms coping with a vast array of opaque stimuli in 
inner cognition and outward perception. Drawing on the hypotheses raised by the 
‘interpretive framework’ of cognition, and especially on its reappraisal of inner transparency 
(Transparency 1), this essay aims at addressing, refining and reassessing an equally recent 
debate in narrative theory about the transparency of fictional minds. From one side of the 
fence, a longstanding and foundational claim about fictional minds’ transparency suggests 
that literature is unique insofar as it allows – unlike real-life cognition –  transparent access to 
multiple minds from the inside (T3). The origin of this view is Dorrit Cohn’s seminal study, 
Transparent Minds (1978) – a title which programmatically foregrounds the accessibility 
problem. Cohn’s central idea is that narrative fiction ‘depends on what writers and readers 
know least in life: how another mind thinks, another body feels’.7 Narrative fiction, in this 
view, is unique in providing a transparent access to hidden inner states of other minds (beliefs, 
desires, conscious thinking, and so on) – a kind of inner accessibility to other minds that is 
precluded in real-life cognition.  
On the other side, a new wave of cognitive narratologists has criticised this view as 
flawed by a Cartesian conception of the mind as internal and private. As Brian McHale notes, 
in defence of Cohn’s account, ‘[o]ver the course of the past decade, Cohn has been turned 
into a kind of straw-man (or straw-woman, I suppose) to be set up and knocked down in 
arguments about fictional minds and the relative advantages of classical versus post- classical 
accounts of mind in fiction’.8 Among others, David Herman as countered by dubbing Cohn’s 
position the ‘Exceptionality Thesis’, insofar as it assumes ‘that only fictional narratives can 
give us direct, “inside” views of characters’ mind’.9 This is not the case, Herman argues, 
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because, as enactive and embodied approaches to the mind argue , the mind is neither ‘closed 
off’ from the world nor limited to its internal states and processes. In Alan Palmer’s words, 
traces of ‘the whole mind’ (either actual or fictional) are distributed into visible (and 
readable) actions and behaviours and therefore the mind is transparent also from the outside 
(T4).10  
The extension of the transparency of the mind into the outside world and storyworld 
has undeniably enlarged and enriched the study of actual and fictional minds. However, this 
should not come at the price of downgrading the complexity of the inner life and cognition, 
or their fictional representation. In sympathy with the post-classical approaches that criticise 
Cohn’s view, I build on post-Cartesian or anti-Cartesian cognitive science (the ‘interpretive 
framework’) to defend and reassess the exceptionality of fictional transparency. I will suggest 
that fiction remains exceptional precisely in disclosing what Peter Carruthers has called the 
‘opacity of mind’: the constant activity of interpretive processes running at the level of inner 
cognition and outward perception.11 
The next section elaborates upon the two instances of transparency in cognitive 
science and explains their relevance for narrative theory. In parallel, I present counter-
arguments from the  ‘interpretive framework’ of cognition, which advocates that the mind’s 
transparency (T1 & 2) is an illusory feeling and that cognition is interpretive in nature, 
constantly mediated, and rifle with opacity. With a particular focus on moods and 
introspective opacity (conditions in which the embodied, anti-Cartesian dimension of 
cognition is particularly relevant), in the last section I use Kate Chopin’s The Awakening 
(1899) to show how narrative fiction can transparently bring these interpretive processes to 
the fore (T3); either when this mediation is unperceived by the experiencing character or 
when opacity becomes perceptible also to her. In the conclusion, I propose a visualisation of 
my reappraisal of the Exceptionality Thesis displaying how, notwithstanding the important 
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insights coming from its post-classical critiques, narrative fiction remains exceptional in 
conceding transparent access to the opacity of fictional minds.  
 
Transparencies and the ‘Interpretive Cognition’ Framework 
Interpretive accounts of cognition can significantly modify each of the transparencies 
identified in cognitive science and narrative theory. Beginning with self-transparency (T1), 
we have seen that this Cartesian view about the functioning of our own mind assumes that, in 
Carruthers’s synthesis, ‘[k]nowledge of one’s own thoughts… (one’s beliefs, judgments, 
desire, hopes, fears, decisions, and intentions) is supposed to be especially intimate, direct 
and reliable’.12 We are all familiar with this intuitive feeling of being able to introspectively 
access and know our own thoughts or emotions as if they were objects to be directly ‘looked 
at’, without any interposing layer mediating the process. In his The Opacity of Mind, 
Carruthers collects evidences from Chinese, Indian and other cultures suggesting that this 
‘intuition of non-interpretive access to our own thoughts and thought processes’ is so 
widespread to appear as a ‘human universal’13.  
For ‘interpretivsts’ such as Carruthers, however, the intuition that minds are 
transparent to themselves is ‘radically mistaken’.14 In contrast, he suggests that access to our 
own mind is always ‘sensorily mediated’ and ‘equally interpretive in character’, and that the 
mind is therefore opaque to itself. 15  The feeling of transparent access is just an 
epiphenomenon of our interpretive machinery that makes us perceive the access to our own 
mind as direct and effortlessly non-inferential, while we are instead constantly dealing with 
inchoate mental and bodily stimuli. Carruthers puts forward a fascinating hypothesis for the 
creation of this interpretive by-product:. the mind redirects towards itself the same 
mindreading module we use to ascribe intentions, beliefs, desires, and motivations to other 
people. In his words, ‘the same mental faculty that evolved for reading the minds of others 
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and negotiating the social world gets turned toward the self, issuing in knowledge of our own 
thoughts’.16 In coping with the epistemological opacity of our own mind, Carruthers says, we 
mindread ourselves. It is clearly a special kind of mindreading, since in addition to the same 
external, contextual and bodily stimuli through which we can interpret other minds we have a 
private unique set of available information. As Carruthers concludes, in comparison to our 
externally directed mindreading,  ‘self-knowledge can then rely on anything that is accessible 
through the same sensory channels, including one’s own behavior and context, but also one’s 
own visual imagery, inner speech, felt affect, and other forms of sensory experience’. 17 
Carruthers is not alone in adopting this view. Among other ‘interpretivists’18, the 
cognitive neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga has been accumulating convincing empirical 
evidence with split-brain patients which suggests that most of our conscious life is the 
outcome of explanations from ‘post hoc information’.19 In Gazzaniga’s words, ‘we live with 
a slight tape delay on what our brains are doing’, and therefore we interpret our actions and 
feelings by constructing meaningful coherent stories as ‘post hoc explanations using post hoc 
observations with no access to nonconscious processing’.20 For Gazzaniga, this post hoc 
storytelling activity is neurologically conducted by what he calls ‘the interpreter’, a specific 
area located in the left hemisphere of our brain.21 This left-hemisphere interpreter ‘constructs 
theories to assimilate perceived information into a comprehensible whole’.22 Together with 
(and possibly complementing) Carruthers’s hypothesis of a redirected mindreading module, 
the interpreter is an alternative candidate for the meaning-making activity through which the 
mind seeks to interpret its opacity.  
It is important to stress that, whether by mindreading or by using our left-hemisphere, 
such interpretive activity occurs mostly in the background of our conscious awareness. 
Whenever interpretative processes are successful (but not necessarily correct), the opacity is 
explained away and the feeling of transparency thereby preserved. Having said that, there are 
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several examples of consciously experienced disruption to self-transparency. Carruthers and 
Gazzaniga mostly refer to psychopathological or neurological conditions to exemplify this 
disruption. Unlike them, Thomas Metzinger links the problem of self-representation to its 
transparent quality, suggesting that even emotions can produce a breakdown of the 
transparent representational glass. In short, Metzinger claims that our sense of self consists in 
a transparent representational model operating in the background of our experience. Certain 
kinds of emotions, in this respect, can ‘allow a representational system to experience itself as 
a representational system’. 23  Every time we experience emotions that fail to match the 
transparent representational model of our self (and of our self in the world), the mediated, 
interpretive, opaque nature of our existence comes to the fore. These states of what Metzinger 
calls ‘phenomenal opacity’ are anything but rare in literature, as we shall see in Kate 
Chopin’s short novel, and the special kind of transparent access to these opaque states in 
narrative fiction is central to my own thesis about its exceptionality.24  
Moving to phenomenal transparency (T2), we come to a kind of transparency 
occurring between the mind and the experienced world.  Also defined as the ‘transparency of 
experience’,25 the first optical formulation of this view is famously attributed to G. E. Moore; 
for Moore, that ‘which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to escape us: it seems, 
if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent – we look through it and see nothing but the 
blue’.26  In other words, there are no qualities or phenomenal states to introspect in our 
perceptual experience of the world but the experienced world itself. Commenting on Moore’s 
passage, Sarah Paul rightly notes how ‘Moore’s sense of transparency is thus the opposite of 
the Cartesian notion. Far from being self-intimating, the mental sensation of blue is here 
declared to be nowhere to be found.’27 Whereas in self-transparency the optical metaphor is 
used to point at a maximum degree of introspective accessibility, in the context of our 
sensory relationship with the external world it alludes to the impossibility of experiencing 
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what (if anything) lies between ourselves and the object of our experience. As Metzinger says, 
revisiting self-transparency and perceptual experiences in terms of ‘phenomenal opacity’, in 
relation to our experience of the outside world ‘[t]ransparency is a special form of darkness. 
With regard to the phenomenology of visual experience transparency means that we are not 
able to see something, because it is transparent. We don’t see the window, but only the bird 
flying by’.28 Like self-transparency, though, the window is there, interpretivsts would claim, 
and it can get unexpectedly dusty.  
To explain the opaque nature of the window as well as its habitual transparency in 
perception, Jacob Hohwy – another important voice within the ‘interpretive cognition’ 
framework – resorts to a probabilistic and inferential model of the mind. Hohwy suggests that 
every time our mind engages with the environment, it makes predictions about incurring 
stimuli based on an internal model of the world and of the possible causes and events within 
it. What happens next, for Hohwy,  can be characterised like this: ‘[i]f the prediction is 
correct the model is supported, if not then the model parameters must be updated or another 
model chosen. Perception is then driven by the models that best predict the sensory input at 
any given time.’29 According to this perspective, through the window we see a bird because 
we predict a bird, and ‘conscious perception is viewed as the upshot of unconscious 
inferences’. 30  The unconscious quality of the prediction and its simultaneity with the 
incurring stimulus are crucial aspects for not intending perceptual inferences as some sort of 
conscious reasoning taking place after the perceptual event. On this point, Hohwy makes very 
clear that ‘this is a theory of perception, not of conceptual or semantic elaboration of 
perception. It is not that we have a certain coherent perceptual experience that we through 
Bayesian inference get to label ‘bicycle’, say. The very perceptual experience itself is driven 
by the unconscious inference’.31 Since this predictive process is usually very effective, and 
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our mind is incredibly efficient in updating its own models, the presence of this predictive 
(that is, interpretive) mechanism is usually transparent.  
This is why we do not live our lives with the exhausting feeling of incessantly 
interpreting an ever-changing world. Perceptual stability is the norm, and ‘actual variability is 
not salient to us because unconscious inference normally goes smoothly’.32 But once again, 
this perceived stability and the related sense of an absence of interpretive layers is just a 
feeling. What the mind actually does is deal with inchoate perceptual information, 
simultaneously transformed into meaningful experiences. As with phenomenal transparency, 
then, there are potential breakdowns of usually diaphanous processes, with a consequent 
disclosure of the opacity inherent to our mind. Importantly, Howhy’s theory of predictive 
processing has the ambition of accounting also for emotional states and, together with 
perceptual events, it can profitably enlighten the representation of emotional episodes in 
fictional narratives, such as Kate Chopin’s story, where upheavals in emotional transparency 
give way to a sustained feeling of unknowing.  
How and to what extent can this recent reappraisal of the transparency of the mind 
within cognitive science, which favours an interpretive view of cognition, affect its 
conceptualization within narrative theory? First, if we rethink Cohn’s view – call it fictional 
minds’ transparency (T3) – in the light of the ‘interpretive cognition’ framework, then we 
can obtain, I argue, a more precise and specific hypothesis about what is exceptional in the 
literary representations of cognition.33 To say that fictional minds are exceptional because we 
can access them, unlike real-life cognition, from the inside does not say enough about what 
kind of cognitive process we are accessing. In addition, this simplified view seems to imply 
that, as soon as we are granted entrance, everything we find should be a Cartesian crystalline 
architecture of directly accessible mental states (transparently accessed by the character). 
Admittedly, both Cohn’s view and Herman’s counter-thesis are more complex than that, and 
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they acknowledge a degree of uncertainty and self-interpretation.34 Yet the resulting dispute 
keeps revolving around the (inner or outer) transparency of fictional minds, rather than on 
their opacity. By defending and expanding Cohn’s position, I want to suggest that the 
transparency of fictional minds as usually conceived describes only the quality of the 
gateway, leaving the degree of visibility within the mental territories unspecified and 
unexplored. Reworking Cohn’s optical metaphor, the translucent involucre that allows a 
reader to enter fictional minds’ cognition is just a first surface, disclosing the (either 
consciously perceived or unconsciously running) interpretive layers operating within the 
fictional mind’s opacity (and here the possessive points at the beholder’s, not at the reader’s 
accessibility). 
Once we acknowledge this as a unique quality of narrative fiction, the objection that 
fictional minds are also accessible from the outside appears weakened or positively 
complementary. In the latter spirit, Lisa Zunshine refers to the outer accessibility of fictional 
minds in terms of ‘embodied transparency’ (T4) to describe fictional passages ‘putting 
protagonists in situations in which their bodies spontaneously reveal their true feelings, 
sometimes against their wills’.35  If not rare, this type of bodily transparency suitable to 
mindreading is not the norm in narrative fiction, as Zunshine herself readily admits. This 
does not mean that the inside presentation of the interpretive processes dealing with inner and 
outer opacities cannot be related by the reader to outer reactions, bodily signals and 
environmental conditions, or that all these externalities cannot constitute stimuli to be 
processed by a fictional mind’s interpretative apparatus. David Herman is particularly acute 
on this point, stressing how, especially in modernist literature, fiction often presents the ‘tight 
coupling between the mind and world, the nexus between intelligent agents and the 
environments they seek to navigate’.36 Markers of this nexus are undeniably accessible from 
outside, inferentially triggering intentional assumptions about which mental state a person is 
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undergoing at a specific moment in a specific (story)world situation. Granted this, the 
complex functioning of the interpretive mechanism operating within the mind itself, despite 
being world-involving (both in T1 & T2), is largely invisible from the outside, and often 
unperceived by the very experiencer. As we are about to test in the following section, though, 
narrative fiction is capable of revealing its functioning and breakdowns, and one of its central 
interests appears rather to be the very point where feelings of transparencies are perturbed or 
assailed by the throes of opacity.  
 
Affective Patterns, Moods, Perceptions: Opacity and the Interpretive Mind in Kate 
Chopin’s The Awakening 
Modernist literature is usually regarded as subverting the epistemic confidence in the 
possibility of acquiring knowledge of one’s self and of the surrounding world. As Philip 
Weinstein notes, defining the paradigm that modernist fiction aims to attack, ‘coming to know, 
gradually refining one’s identity within orientational space and linear time, is the bread and 
butter of Western fiction’.37 The present continuous tense shaping  this definition points to 
the progressive aspect of the epistemic trajectory. The same tense, in the title of Kate 
Chopin’s The Awakening (a text from the early modernist period), points more at the dynamic 
and sustained process of coming to unknow – despite the novel having a sort of tragic 
epistemic fulfilment. Of the difficult protagonist’s transition (or awakening) from a previous, 
socially conforming identity to a new, unstable self, the novel represents mostly the growing 
opacity and cognitive vertigo opened up by the first half of the transitional arc of her main 
character, Edna Pontillier. The story is textured neither by punctual epiphanies and discrete 
moments of understanding, nor by contingent suspensions of mental transparencies. It is 
rather a careful rendering of the gradual onset of opaque states in her mind, largely triggered 
by unsettling bodily feelings and harbouring emotions that Mrs. Pontillier struggles to 
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interpret. In other words, the novel portrays how self-transparency or phenomenal 
transparency might not be glasses that suddenly break, but windows that slowly get enfeebled 
by progressive (and progressing) gusts of opacity. As the fabrication of the transparent model 
of the self (T1) or of the world (T2) is a temporal process, so is their deterioration, discarding, 
or substitution. 
An account of emotions as temporally unfolding events, significantly involving bodily 
states, is crucial to an understanding of the representation of mind’s opacity in The 
Awakening. Surprisingly, affective science has mostly regarded emotions as small-scale 
events, as momentary and corollary to our cognitive life. In Giovanna Colombetti’s words, 
‘emotions and moods of the affective scientist are usually temporary episodes that take place 
in an otherwise affect-free mind… they remain surface phenomena of an otherwise affect-
free mind’.38 Drawing on the conceptual toolbox of dynamic system theory, she suggests that 
we should instead think at emotions as ‘dynamic patterns’. 39  Without entering into the 
complexity and richness of Colombetti’s arguments, in what follows I endorse two main 
tenets of her view: first, that emotion are temporal events, with a trajectory and unfolding 
patterns (call it affective patterns); second, that these patterns largely involve bodily states 
and changes in our perceptual experiences. Importantly, given the role of emotions and 
bodily states in self-knowledge (T1) and perceptual experiences (T2), I suggest that temporal 
dynamics and unfolding patterns are key aspects also of the growing opacity of Edna’s mind.   
Since the temporal unfolding of opacity is central to my reading, I will present my 
reading of it linearly, from the beginning to its tragic end. The novella, narrated in the third-
person by an external narrator, is the story of Edna Pontillier, faithful wife of a businessman 
with whom every summer she leaves New Orleans to spend the season on Grand Isle. The 
novel is set in the particular summer in which she meets Robert, the son of a seasonal 
neighbour within the small summer community of Grand Isle. This encounter slowly 
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develops into an unfulfilled passion that will lead Edna to commit suicide. Recasting the 
story in the terms of the present discussion, the plot can be described as the gradual 
deterioration of Edna’s self-transparency, with related changes in her perceptual experience. 
Recalling Metzinger’s definition of transparent representational models, after encountering 
Robert the transparent models (of her self, of her marriage, and of the social world) that 
previously worked smoothly in the background of her existence progressively become 
ineffectual.  
As the narrator tells us when introducing Edna, a tension within her was something 
she had long been acquainted with, and at ‘a very early period she apprehended instinctively 
the dual life – that outward existence which conforms, the inward life which questions’ (13; 
emphasis mine). The first encounter with Robert, even if eventless and involving pure bodily 
proximity, already establishes an unrecognised crevice in her mental model of a conforming 
life. Consequently, the inward life will soon gather states of opacity that must be questioned. 
Having met Robert, in fact, she comes home and then, after a habitual reproach from her 
husband about the care of their children, she starts to cry without apparent reason: ‘[s]he 
could not told why she was crying. Such experiences at the foregoing were not uncommon in 
her married life’ (6). Subsequently, we are given access to the inner and bodily counter-part 
of this external reaction, and the first blow of opacity that her interpretive inner machinery 
(now manifesting itself) is unable to process:  
 
An indescribable oppression, which seemed to generate in some unfamiliar part 
of her consciousness, filled her whole being with a vague anguish. It was like a 
shadow, like a mist passing across her soul’s summer day. It was strange and 
unfamiliar; it was a mood. She did not seat there inwardly upbraiding her 
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husband, lamenting at Fate, which had directed her footsteps to the path, which 
they had taken. She was just having a good cry all to herself. (6; emphasis mine).  
 
As we have seen in Carruthers’s critique of self-transparency, external behaviours and 
proprioceptive felt affects or bodily states are among the raw material that our mind 
interpretively processes. When interpretation fails, the transparency is disrupted and we 
become aware of the actual opacity lying within ourselves. In this passage, this suspension of 
transparency is channelled by Edna’s bodily feelings, whose interpretive resistance defeats 
descriptions and leads to vague analogical images (‘like a shadow, like a mist’) which 
attempt to make sense of this unfamiliar state. Cohn, it should be said, already noted how 
often in narrative fiction ‘the mental activity bypasses not only self-articulation, but also self-
understanding’.40 Consistently with my reading of the analogic sentences in this passage, 
Cohn also added that the arising of self-opacity (my terms) is directly proportional to the 
increase of what she calls ‘psycho-analogies’ – analogic images that either the character or 
the narrator associate to these unspeakable states.41  
The opaque state that Edna finds impossible to describe would be defined 
phenomenologically as a ‘mood’. In phenomenology, ‘mood’ is a specific term that translates 
Heidegger’s concept of Stimmung.42 In Matthew Ratcliffe’s synthesis, ‘moods constitute a 
sense of belonging to the world. They do so by revealing the world as a realm of practical 
purposes, values, and goals’.43 Normally moods are unperceived, transparent, acting in the 
background of our consciousness and they play an important role in our sense of familiarity 
with our self (T1) and with the world (T2). If and when this familiarity is broken, Ratcliffe 
elucidates, moods can reveal themselves negatively as opacity, as ‘an absence of warming 
familiarity, of significance, of belonging’.44 This definition and functioning of mood highly 
resonate with Edna’s description. The sense of familiarity and of purposefulness that was 
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guaranteed by previously effective transparent models, or by an unproblematic sensory 
mindreading, turns into an opacity to which she can refer only psycho-analogically. As 
Colombetti points out, a key difference between moods and emotions is that they have a 
longer ‘duration’, constituting in this respect a sort of affective ground for emotions and 
longer affective patterns.45 Proprioceptive bodily signals can become perceptible traces of 
this affective ground whenever a mood resists interpretation for lack of effective emotional 
models. As Hohwy argues, ‘unexpected changes in arousal and bodily state create 
discrepancy with existing generative models of emotions and bodily sensations, and different 
revisions of the models are then explored in an attempt to minimise discrepancy.’46 The novel 
will stage the impossibility of Edna closing this gap between new emotions that escape 
previous models of interpretation and the exploration of alternative models to make sense of 
them. At this particular moment, though, Edna has yet to recognise this emergence of an 
opaque mood as the beginning of an affective trajectory. Yet it will soon reveal its influence 
by (dis)orienting Edna’s actions, forcing her mind to experience several interpretive battles 
with opaque states.  
A first example of inexplicable actions within her new affective pattern occurs when 
Robert invites her to the beach: she ‘could not have told why, wishing to go to the beach with 
Robert, she should in the first place have declined, and in the second place have followed in 
the obedience of one of the two contradictory impulses which impelled her. A certain light 
was beginning to dawn dimly within her’ (13). Edna’s impulse to deny the invitation is 
driven by her previous transparent model of self and social behaviour. Liberating new models 
of possible worlds and identities are slowly ‘beginning to dawn dimly within her’ (a further 
psycho-analogy) but, as the narrator glosses, ‘the beginning of things, of a world especially, 
is necessarily vague, tangled, chaotic, and exceedingly disturbing’ (13). In Gazzaniga’s terms, 
the ‘post-hoc explanations’ that the ‘interpreter’ in our mind concocts to provide us with 
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motivations for our actions seems to fail in Edna’s mind. She finds her actions preceding her, 
unexplained, with a sense of intentional agency altered and diminished. From an 
‘interpretivist’ perspective, she becomes aware of the ‘slight tape delay’ with which our lives 
are lived, of the interpretive nature to what we usually take to be more intimate and direct. 
Towards the end of the novel, once the tragic affective pattern is about to conclude, Edna 
experiences a similar delay in relation to her thoughts, too, when she finds herself walking ‘in 
an absent-minded way, as she had walked one night at Grand Isle, as if her thoughts had gone 
ahead of her and she was striving to overtake them’ (111; emphasis mine). This equal 
treatment of thoughts and actions in the novel coincides with Carruthers’s idea that the 
interpretive access to our own mind recruits and processes a vast array of sensory stimuli 
from external and internal sources – and, consequently, that the opacity resulting from the 
jamming of our interpretive tape might come from both sides.  
As the affective pattern unfolds, Edna is increasingly finding herself introspectively 
attending to incomprehensible and ever-changing proprioceptive bodily feelings, from 
oppression (‘[a] feeling of oppression and drowsiness overcame Edna during the service. Her 
head began to ache, and the lights on the altar swayed before her eyes’ [35]) to exultancy (‘a 
feeling of exultation overtook her, as if some power of significant import had been given to 
control the working of her body and her soul’ [27]); from longing for Robert (‘the thought of 
him was like an obsession… reviving again with an intensity which filled her with an 
incomprehensible longing’ [54; emphasis mine]) to a rapid alternation of conflicting 
emotions within a short period of time (‘there were days when she was very happy without 
knowing why. She was happy to be alive and breathing…[t]here were days when she was 
unhappy, she did not why, -- when it did not seem worth while to be glad or sorry, to be alive 
or dead’ [58; emphasis mine]). Because of this sensuous representation of a defeat of 
rationality and introspective clarity, The Awakening was regarded by one reviewer at the 
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timeas ‘unhealthily introspective and morbid’.47 Introspection, however, can be considered 
not just an attitude of Edna’s mind, but a proper theme within the novel.  
For instance, at the beginning of the narrative a friend of Edna asks her, ‘[o]f whom – 
of what are you thinking?’. She first replies ‘Nothing’, before adding: ‘[h]ow stupid! But it 
seems to me it is the reply we make instinctively to such question… Let me see. I was really 
not conscious of anything; but perhaps I can retrace my thoughts’ (15-16). This scene 
interestingly recalls a recent introspective methodology within cognitive science, the 
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES), where a subject wears a beeper that goes off 
randomly a few times each day, and she is asked to record what she was thinking at the 
moment of the beep.48 Edna’s friend functions like a human beeper, and her answer is nicely 
consistent with DES research in suggesting a weak awareness in cognition of occurring 
thoughts and a structural difficulty in retracing them. For most of the novel, however, we are 
located within Edna’s spontaneous introspective activity, naturally triggered by bodily 
feelings and free from the task of reporting them – and this is an important difference of 
fictional accessibility over scientific external study of mental states.  
Introspective moments of self-opacity are not the only condition in which we are able 
to trace Edna’s affective pattern. Briefly touching the second kind of transparency (T2), her 
perceptual experiences also change as the opacity unfolds. Even if these changes in 
phenomenal transparency mostly fall behind Edna’s conscious awareness, their presence is a 
sign to the reader of the interpretive nature of her perception – and of their accessibility, 
another privilege of narrative fiction over real-life cognition. For instance, after her first 
encounter with Robert, the meeting continues unconsciously (but evidently) to orient her 
perceptions, when she feels the ‘breeze soft and languorous that came up from the south, 
charged with the seductive odour of the sea’ (12; emphasis mine). Later, when Edna is on the 
boat with Robert and a former lover of him, her unconscious jealousy makes her perceive the 
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sun as ‘beginning to bite’ and the ‘swift breeze seemed to Edna to bury the sting of it into the 
pores of her face and hands’ (34; emphasis mine). In the latter passage, Edna consciously 
perceives the world as hostile, but she is unconscious that her mind is interpreting perceptual 
stimuli this way. According to Hohwy’s interpretive account of cognition, perceptions and 
emotions both rely on models of the world that mediate perceptual or emotional experiences. 
In The Awakening, each progressive deterioration in self-transparency (T1) evidently affect 
Edna’s perception (T2); and as soon as a former model of her self is no longer capable of 
interpreting her inner states, she undergoes changes in her perceptual model of the world. 
Once again, the inextricable link between epistemic models of the self and perceptual models 
of the world remains unconscious to Edna, but hinted at by the narrator when he tells us that 
‘she could only realise that she herself – her present self – was in some way different from 
the other self. That she was seeing with different eyes and making the acquaintance of new 
conditions in herself that colored and changed the environment, she did not yet suspect’ (40; 
emphasis mine). In line with the ‘interpretive cognition’ framework, knowledge not only of 
her own mind (T1), but also of the world, comes to Edna in an always mediated fashion (T2). 
What Heidegger eloquently point outs about the perception of sounds can therefore be 
extended to all perceptual experiences when he affirms that ‘[w]hat we ‘first’ hear is never 
noises or complexes of sounds, but the cracking waggon, the motor-cycle. We hear the 
column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling’.49 This is a 
list of successfully mediated perceptions but (aswith Edna’s experience) sometimes we might 
be devoid of effective models for our self and emotions. Consequently, a mounting opacity in 
self-knowledge can unconsciously manipulate our interpretive processes in perception. 
Worse than perceptual instability, however, is the extreme scenario in which our mind gives 
up interpretations entirely. After a sustained confrontation with inner and outer opacities 
(with previous models discarded and without any reliable new model to make senses of them), 
 19 
Edna ends up in a sensory and attentional inertia, as a sign that her interpretive mind has 
dangerously stalled. Interpretive processes, even when failing, are vital tools of a quest for 
meaning. At the end of her affective trajectory, instead, Edna’s mind has ultimately 
succumbed to opacity and ceased to interpret. In the final scene of the novel, after Robert has 
definitively left, she is walking on ‘down to the beach, rather mechanically, not noticing 
anything special except that the sun was hot. She was not dwelling upon any particular train 
of thought’ (114). Soon after that, she will drown herself into the ocean.  
Thanks to the exceptionally transparent accessibility that fiction concedes to the 
progressive damaging of Edna’s transparencies and to the mounting trajectory of her opacity, 
we can internally evaluate even this extreme action as a meaningful end of her affective 
pattern. From the outside, the temporal unfolding of mental opacity – with its complex, 
gradual and interlinked influencing of self-knowledge and perception – leading to this tragic 
ending would have been, I argue, impossible to infer or mindread.  
 
 
The Exceptionality Thesis Reassessed 
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To conclude, here is a visualisation of my reassessment of the Exceptionality Thesis in the 
light of what the ‘interpretive cognition’ framework claims about mental transparencies. In 
summarised form, my argument is that, notwithstanding the important insights of post-
classical approaches to the mind, narrative fiction remains exceptional in allowing 
transparent access to the opacity of fictional minds. By drawing on interpretive accounts to 
self-transparency and phenomenal transparency, I have shown how narrative fiction is able to 
represent a fine-grained rendition of the processes mediating cognition and perception. 
Importantly, fiction can do this either when interpretive processes are consciously perceived 
as such by the character (call it conscious opacity) or when processes are running in the 
background of his or her awareness (call it unconscious opacity). In addition, narrative fiction 
not only can guarantee access to different kinds of opacities and transparencies (T1 and T2), 
but it can also represent the entanglement and mutual influencing between them, as in Edna’s 
mind. Importantly, as I have explained by building on the concept of emotions as ‘dynamic 
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patterns’, another core feature of this exceptionality access is the understanding of the 
temporal unfolding of emotional states and self-knowledge. Not secondarily, as displayed in 
the visual model of my reappraisal of the thesis, narrative fiction extends all these privileges 
to multiple minds.  
In the model, we have two minds sharing a world, either real or fictional. In everyday 
cognition, if you are one of the two minds (say Mind 1), you have a transparent access only 
to your own interpretive processes (and only when they become opaque). However, as 
Herman and others suggest, through our mindreading faculty (MR 1 and 2) we also achieve a 
certain degree of transparency of Mind 2. Nonetheless, even by mindreading another mind 
we never access its internal interpretive processes. Reframing my thesis in a negative way, 
we can never transparently access the inner opacity of another mind.  The exceptional range 
of accessibility of fiction, instead, enables us transparently to enter both minds’ interpretive 
processes (IP1 and IP2) as well as to experience the reciprocal mindreading activities. In 
conclusion, if cognitive approaches to fictional minds rightfully maintain that the mind has a 
certain degree of transparency in the outside world, my contention is that only fiction gives 
access to multiple internal opacities and to the interpretive nature of cognition.  
This revaluation of the opacity of fictional minds in relation to mental transparencies, 
together with cognitively reassessing the Exceptionality Thesis, can pave the way to future 
research on the narratological modes of representation of opaque states and of their varieties 
(with a particular attention to the embodied nature of interpretive cognition). Additionally, a 
better understanding of the narrative treatment of self-transparency and phenomenal 
transparency (and of related opacities and interpretive processes) can ultimately provide tools 
also for cognitive and phenomenological research. This would endorse Alva Noë’s 
suggestion that ‘[t]he work of some artists can teach us about perceptual consciousness by 
furnishing us with the opportunity to have a special kind of reflective experience. In this way, 
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art can be a tool for phenomenological investigation’.50 This is another thesis, even more 
exceptional, that cognitive approaches to literature can hopefully investigate further.   
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